Care-theoretic semantics: Problems and non-deterministic solutions (Thomas Ferguson)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on April 3rd from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9205) for a talk by Thomas Ferguson (Czech Academy of Sciences).

Title: Care-theoretic semantics: Problems and non-deterministic solutions

Abstract: In this talk I will present the details of a project of care-theoretic semantics in which a linguistic feature of care–rather than truth–is understood as the fundamental semantic property. I will review the details, including how adopting a bounds consequence position in which bounds are determined by considerations of topic allows one to determine both a theory of inference and theory of meaning on the basis of care alone. I will consider two challenges to the project: that of the reconciliation of topic-theoretic and truth-theoretic bounds (in which we need to acknowledge cases in which a position crosses both types of bounds) and sui generis monstrous content (in which two anodyne sentences together yield a content-theoretic violation). I will show that in both cases intuitions suggest the use of Nmatrices in the style of Avron and consider the merits of their employment in the care-theoretic setting.

Logic and inference in the sender-receiver model (Shawn Simpson)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 20th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9205) for a talk by Shawn Simpson (Pitt).

Title: Logic and inference in the sender-receiver model

Abstract: The sender-receiver model was developed by David Lewis to tackle the question of the conventionality of meaning. But many people who cared about the conventionality of meaning did so because they thought it was intimately connected to the conventionality of logic. Since Lewis’s work, only a few attempts have been made to say anything about the nature of logic and inference from the perspective of the sender-receiver model. This talk will look at the what’s been said in that regard, by Skyrms and others, and suggest a few general lessons.

First-order logics over fixed domain (Gregory Taylor)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 27th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9205) for a talk by Gregory Taylor (CUNY).

Title: First-order logics over fixed domain

Abstract: What we call first-order logic over fixed domain was initiated, in a certain guise, by Peirce around 1885 and championed, albeit in idiosyncratic form, by Zermelo in papers from the 1930s.  We characterize such logics model- and proof-theoretically and argue that they constitute exploration of a clearly circumscribed conception of domain-dependent generality.  Whereas a logic, or family of such, can be of interest for any of a variety of reasons, we suggest that one of those reasons might be that said logic fosters some clarification regarding just what qualifies as a logical concept, a logical operation, or a logical law.

The published paper is available here: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12382.