The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on October 26th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Lisa Warenski (CUNY).

Title: The Metaphysics of Epistemic Norms

Abstract: A metanormative theory inter alia gives an account of the objectivity of normative claims and addresses the ontological status of normative properties in its target domain.  A metanormative theory will thus provide a framework for interpreting the claims of its target first-order theory.  Some irrealist metanormative theories (e.g., Gibbard 1990 and Field 2000, 2009) conceive of normative properties as evaluative properties that may attributed to suitable objects of assessment (doxastic states, agents, or actions) in virtue of systems of norms.  But what are the conditions for the acceptability of systems of norms, and relatedly, correctness of normative judgment?  In this paper, I take up these questions for epistemic norms.  Conditions for the acceptability of epistemic norms, and hence correctness of epistemic judgment, will be based on the critical evaluation of norms for their ability to realize our epistemic aims and values.  Epistemic aims and values, in turn, are understood to be generated from the epistemic point of view, namely the standpoint of valuing truth.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on November 2nd from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Heinrich Wansing (Bochum).

Title: A Note on Synonymy in Proof-Theoretic Semantics

Abstract: The topic of identity of proofs was put on the agenda of general (or structural) proof theory at an early stage. The relevant question is: When are the differences between two distinct proofs (understood as linguistic entities, proof figures) of one and the same formula so inessential that it is justified to identify the two proofs? The paper addresses another question: When are the differences between two distinct formulas so inessential that these formulas admit of identical proofs? The question appears to be especially natural if the idea of working with more than one kind of derivations is taken seriously. If a distinction is drawn between proofs and disproofs (or refutations) as primitive entities, it is quite conceivable that a proof of one formula amounts to a disproof of another formula, and vice versa. The paper develops this idea.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on October 19th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Michael Glanzberg (Rutgers).

Title: Models, Model Theory, and Modeling

Abstract: In this paper, I shall return to the relations between logic and semantics of natural language.  My main goal is to advance a proposal about what that relation is.  Logic as used in the study of natural language—an empirical discipline—functions much like specific kinds of scientific models. Particularly, I shall suggest, logics can function like analogical models.  More provocatively, I shall also suggest they can function like model organisms often do in the biological sciences, providing a kind of controlled environment for observations.  My focus here will be on a wide family of logics that are based on model theory, so in the end, these claims apply equally to model theory itself.  Along the way towards arguing for my thesis about models in science, I shall also try to clarify the role of model theory in logic.  At least, I shall suggest, it can play distinct roles in each domain. It can offer something like scientific models when it comes to empirical applications, while at the same time furthering conceptual analysis of a basic notion of logic.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on October 12th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Brian Cross Porter (CUNY).

Title: A Metainferential Hierarchy of Validity Curry Paradoxes

Abstract: The validity curry paradox is a paradox involving a validity predicate which does not use any of the logical connectives; triviality can be derived using only the structural rules of Cut and Contraction with intuitively plausible rules for the validity predicate. This has been used to argue that we should move to a substructural logic dropping Cut or Contraction. In this talk, I’ll present metainferential versions of the validity curry paradox. We can recreate the validity curry paradox at the metainferential level, the metametainferential level, the metametametainferential level, and so on ad infinitum. I argue that this hierarchy of metaⁿinferential validity curry paradoxes poses a problem for the standard substructural solutions to the validity curry paradox.