Dispensing with the grounds of logical necessity (Otávio Bueno)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 11th from 4:15-6:15 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 7395) for a talk by Otávio Bueno (Miami).

Title: Dispensing with the grounds of logical necessity

Abstract: Logical laws are typically conceived as being necessary. But in virtue of what is this the case? That is, what are the grounds of logical necessity? In this paper, I examine four different answers to this question in terms of: truth-conditions, invariance of truth-values under different interpretations, possible worlds, and brute facts. I ultimately find all of them wanting. I conclude that an alternative conception of logic that dispenses altogether with grounds of logical necessity provides a less troublesome alternative. I then indicate some of the central features of this conception.

Declaring no dependence (Elise Crull)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 4th from 4:15-6:15 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 7395) for a talk by Elise Crull (CUNY).

Title: Declaring no dependence

Abstract: Viable fundamental ontologies require at least one suitably stable, generic-yet-toothy metaphysical dependence relation to establish fundamentality. In this talk I argue that recent experiments in quantum physics using Page-Wootters devices to model global vs. local dynamics cast serious doubt on the existence of such metaphysical dependence relations when – and arguably, inevitably within any ontological framework – physical systems serve as the relata.

Semantic paradoxes as collective tragedies (Matteo Plebani)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on February 26th from 4:15-6:15 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 7395) for a talk by Matteo Plebani (Turin).

Title: Semantic paradoxes as collective tragedies

Abstract: What does it mean to solve a paradox? A common assumption is that to solve a paradox we need to find the wrong step in a certain piece of reasoning. In this talk, I will argue while in the case of some paradoxes such an assumption might be correct, in the case of paradoxes such as the liar and Curry’s paradox it can be questioned.