The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on September 29th from 2:00-4:00 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 8203) for a talk by Will Nava (NYU).

Title: Horizontal Fregeanism

Abstract: Fregeanism is the view that primitive expressive roles correspond to metaphysically distinct kinds. For example: singular terms refer to objects whereas predicates ascribe properties, and properties are not objects. Fregeanism is typically paired with the assumption that properties cannot apply to properties of the same ‘rank’, thereby generating a hierarchical space of metaphysical kinds (and corresponding expressive roles). I propose an alternative horizontal Fregeanism, on which properties can self-apply, so no hierarchy is introduced. The metaphysical kinds are just objects, n-place properties (for each n), and propositions. In this talk, I’ll defend horizontal Fregeanism over the hierarchical alternative. I’ll also argue that the view calls for a novel syntax; one that allows direct self-application (i.e. sentences of the form FF), while still respecting the distinction between objects, properties, and propositions. I will present this syntax, along with an attractive logic formulated in it.