Logic of Presence (Yasuo Deguchi)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on September 12th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto).

Title: Logic of Presence

Abstract: This talk will propose a new modality within the framework of possible worlds, i.e., presence or present world. Presence is defined in terms of mutual or two-ways intentionality: An object X is present to an intentional agent in the actual world iff has active and passive intentionalities toward X, where active intentionality means that A has intentionality to X (e.g., A loves X), and passive intentionality means that A has self-awareness/consciousness as being an object of X’s intentionality (e.g., X loves A). Some actual agents such as your partner is actual and present entity for you, while other actual objects such as minute physical events in an unknown faraway galaxy are actual but not present entities for you. Some counterfactual agents such as those in a digital virtual reality can be counterfactual but present agents for you, while some other counterfactual entities are simply counterfactual and non-present for you. This talk claims that this present approach to virtual reality is better than Chalmers’ virtual realism and Ryan’s recentering approach. This talk also outlines the logic of presence that is an extension of Priest-Berto’s logic of intentionality, being based on possible worlds semantics.

A parametrised axiomatization for a large number of restricted second-order logics (Guillermo Badia)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on October 17th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Guillermo Badia (Queensland).

Title: A parametrised axiomatization for a large number of restricted second-order logics

Abstract: By limiting the range of the predicate variables in a second-order language one may obtain restricted versions of second-order logic such as weak second-order logic or definable subset logic. In this note we provide an infinitary strongly complete axiomatization for several systems of this kind having the range of the predicate variables as a parameter. The completeness argument uses simple techniques from the theory of Boolean algebras. The full paper is here: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.02709.

Note: This is joint work with John Lane Bell.

Fall 2022 Schedule

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time). Talks may be either virtual (via Zoom) or in-person (at the Graduate Center, Room 7314). The provisional schedule is as follows:


Sep 12. Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto)

Sep 19. Bokai Yao (Notre Dame)

Sep 26. Gabriella Pigozzi (Paris Dauphine), Louise Dupuis (Paris Dauphine), and Matteo Michelini (Eindhoven)

Oct 3. Yale Weiss (CUNY)


Oct 17. Guillermo Badia (Queensland)

Oct 24. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)

Oct 31. Friederike Moltmann (CNRS, Côte d’Azur)

Nov 7. Victoria Gitman (CUNY)

Nov 14. Christopher Izgin (Humboldt University)

Nov 21. Marko Malink (NYU) and Anubav Vasudevan (University of Chicago)

Nov 28. William McCarthy (Columbia)

Dec 5. Martin Pleitz (Muenster)

Dec 12. Harry Deutsch (Illinois State) Session Cancelled

Totality=Every; Dependence=Some; Choice=Any; Chance=A (Elia Zardini)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on May 2nd from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 5382) for a talk by Elia Zardini (Madrid).

Title: Totality=Every; Dependence=Some; Choice=Any; Chance=A

Abstract: I’ll first propose an interpretation of the multiplicative/additive distinction among operators arising in a logical framework lacking the structural property of contraction (focusing mostly on the quantifiers): multiplicative operators represent interaction among their operands (with universal quantification representing totality and particular quantification representing dependence) whereas additive operators represent selection (with universal quantification representing choice and particular quantification representing chance). I’ll then argue that reflection on the behaviour of natural-language determiners points towards a very natural working hypothesis that associates: multiplicative universal affirmative with ‘every’; multiplicative particular affirmative with ‘some’; additive universal affirmative with ‘any’; additive particular affirmative with ‘a’. I’ll illustrate the fruitfulness of this hypothesis with four examples, from the epistemic, normative, attitudinal and stative domains respectively.

Neo-Pragmatism about Truth (Julian Schlöder)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on May 9th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Julian Schlöder (UConn).

Title: Neo-Pragmatism about Truth

Abstract: Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. One can implement the deflationist insight in the pragmatist’s theory of content by taking the meaning of the truth predicate to be explained by its inferential relation to assertion. There are two upshots. First, a new diagnosis of the Liar, Revenges and attendant paradoxes: the paradoxes require that truth rules preserve evidence, but they only preserve commitment. Second, one straightforwardly obtains axiomatisations of several supervaluational hierarchies, answering the question of how such theories are to be naturally axiomatised. This is joint work with Luca Incurvati (Amsterdam).

Modal Frame Incompleteness: An Account through Second Order Logic (Mircea Dumitru)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on May 16th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Mircea Dumitru (Bucharest).

Title: Modal Frame Incompleteness: An Account through Second Order Logic

Abstract: Propositional modal logic is usually viewed as a generalization and extension of propositional classical logic. The main argument of this paper is that a good case can be made that modal logic should be construed as a restricted form of second order classical logic. The paper makes use of the embedding of modal logic in second order logic and henceforth it goes on examining one aspect of this second order connection having to do with an incompleteness phenomenon. The leading concept is that modal incompleteness is to be explained as a kind of exemplification of standard order incompleteness. Moreover the modal incompleteness phenomenon is essentially rooted in the weaker expressive power of the language of sentential modal logic as compared to the stronger expressive power of the language of second order logic.

Logical Suppression Anew (Tore Fjetland Øgaard)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on April 25th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 5382) for a talk by Tore Fjetland Øgaard (Bergen).

Title: Logical Suppression Anew

Abstract: Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan argued from their joint paper The Semantics of First Degree Entailment and onward that the variable sharing property is but a mere consequence of a good entailment relation; indeed they viewed it as a mere negative test of adequacy of such a relation, the property itself being a rather philosophically barren concept. Such a relation is rather to be analyzed as a sufficiency relation free of any form of premise suppression. Suppression of premises, therefore, gained center stage. Despite this, however, no serious attempt was ever made at analyzing the concept. A first rigorous analysis of their notion of suppression was given in Farewell to Suppression-Freedom. Therein it was shown that Plumwood and Sylvan’s notion of suppression is in fact properly weaker than variable sharing. I will in the current talk explore ways of strengthening the suppression criterion. One plausible way of doing so, I will argue, yields a principle equivalent to the standard variable sharing property. I hope to show, then, that the notion of suppression is not as unfruitful as I previously made it out to be.

From Truthmaker to Menu Semantics (Justin Bledin)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on April 11th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 5382) for a talk by Justin Bledin (Johns Hopkins).

Title: From Truthmaker to Menu Semantics

Abstract: The logical foundations of English and other natural languages are often assumed to have an essentially truth-theoretic character where the meanings of connectives and quantifiers are grounded in the truth and falsity of sentences. In this talk, I explore a fundamentally different perspective that shifts the focus from the truth value to the ‘menu’. Under this alternative conception of the logic of natural language, speakers manifest their logical competence by, metaphorically speaking, constructing and combining menus of items in various types throughout the grammar. The logical connectives are ‘menu constructors’: negation can be used to express that items are ‘off’ the menu, conjunction produces combinations of ‘on-menu’ items, and disjunction introduces choice between items. My point of departure for this truth displacing project is, oddly enough, recent work in ‘truthmaker’ or ‘exact’ semantics. What I try to do is build a bridge between the standard theory of truthmaker semantics (van Fraassen 1969; Fine 2017), which assigns menus of truthmakers and falsemakers at the sentential level, and compositional semantics in the general style of Montague. One of the most striking aspects of the theory is its treatment of noun phrases, as both quantificational and non-quantificational NPs are all assigned both denotations and ‘anti-denotations’ drawn or constructed from a rich entity space populated by both positive and negative individuals and their sums. Towards the end of the talk, I will try to bring out the explanatory power of menu semantics by applying it to a couple of problem areas in natural language quantification.

Causal Relativism (Jenn McDonald)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on April 4th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 5382) for a talk by Jenn McDonald (Columbia).

Title: Causal Relativism

Abstract: In this talk, I defend a kind of causal relativism. I argue that actual causation cannot be taken to hold simpliciter between two particular things (‘things’ such as events, states-of-affairs, etc.).  Instead, actual causation holds only relative to a background space of possibilities – a modal profile The argument applies generally to any difference-making analysis of actual causation.  But I will use the framework of structural equation models to make the case.   I first demonstrate that structural equation models represent situations in this way – as relative to some modal profile or other.  This observation is underappreciated in the literature.  I show how it raises a problem for all extant analyses of actual causation in terms of these models.  This problem is best responded to by a kind of causal relativism, or so I will argue.  Notably, the problem cannot be avoided by rejecting a structural equation framework.  While the framework is useful for its illustration, the problem arises for any analysis governed by the idea that a cause is what makes a difference in an effect’s occurrence.

Necessity, Essence and Explanation (Dongwoo Kim)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 28th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Dongwoo Kim (CUNY).

Title: Necessity, Essence and Explanation

Abstract: I shall discuss some of the relations between metaphysical modality, essence and explanation. The essentialist approach to metaphysical modality seeks to give an account of necessity (and thus of possibility) as having its source in essence. But what is essence, and in what sense and how does it give rise to necessity? In their recent paper “Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality” (2020), Marion Godman, Antonella Mallozzi and David Papineau have attempted to address these issues with respect to aposteriori necessities concerning kinds. According to their account, the essence of a kind consists in the super-explanatory property—a single property that is causally responsible for a multitude of commonalities shared by the instances of the kind. And they argue that this super-explanatory notion of essence offers a principled account of aposteriori necessities concerning kinds. In this talk, I am going to argue that their account is not satisfactory. I shall examine two main arguments of GMP that the super-explanatory property of a kind is metaphysically necessary and argue that they both are fallacious. Along the way, a general problem will emerge that applies to any account that tries to explicate the notion of essence in terms of an explanatory relation.

Need help with the Commons? Visit our
help page
Send us a message