The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 16th from 2:00-4:00 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9205) for a talk by Liam Ryan (New York) and Otto Lehto (NYU).

Title: The Accretive View of Consciousness: Phenomenal Gradation in Ontogeny and Phylogeny

Abstract: There is a growing body of evidence in the science of consciousness suggesting that experience activates and develops gradually. This paper defends the Accretive View of Consciousness (AVC), focusing on infant consciousness as the primary methodological and normative proving ground. We argue that the neonatal case is decisive: it necessitates “no-report” strategies that triangulate experience from behavioral, neurodevelopmental, and network-level markers. By centering the infant, we show that phenomenal consciousness—what it is like to be a subject—can be increasingly modeled as a capacity that “boots up” through staged accretion rather than switching on at a sharp ontological milestone. This view is buttressed by recent conceptual work that renders gradability coherent, showing how multidimensional profiles can ground principled comparisons of magnitude without collapsing into a single scalar metric. Crucially, this logic extends beyond ontogeny to encompass phylogeny, as shown by animal consciousness and possibly artificial intelligence. We demonstrate that AVC is compatible with leading theories, such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Workspace Theory (GWT), provided they account for the incremental construction of enabling architectures. Finally, we address the normative stakes. If the onset of experience is graded, ethical frameworks that inform moral status must move beyond “on-off” idealizations. The infant case provides a model for an egalitarianism that respects developmental grey zones while maintaining principled protections for all subjects.

Note: This is a joint talk.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 9th from 2:00-4:00 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 5382) for a talk by Chris Steinsvold (CUNY).

Title: A modest internalist semantics for justified belief

Abstract: Interpreting the box of modal logic as justified belief, we consider a principle of Epistemic Modesty (EM), whereby the agent justifiably believes that at least one of their justified beliefs is false. We discuss a simple topological semantics for KD45+EM, and further argue the topological semantics can be interpreted as an internalist semantics. We focus on the mentalist aspect of internalism, whereby whether a belief is justified depends entirely on the mind (as opposed to the external world). Using Cohen and Lehrer’s well-known New Evil Demon Problem, we give a formal definition of mentalism. Generalizing our definition, we show that for a wide variety of formal semantics, if the semantics is mentalist, then EM is valid in the semantics.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on March 2nd from 2:00-4:00 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9207) for a talk by James Walsh (NYU).

Title: A Thomistic synthesis of cosmological and ontological proofs

Abstract: The cosmological and ontological arguments face complementary difficulties. In this talk I will present a synthesis of the two arguments that addresses deficiencies of each. This hybrid argument invokes Thomistic principles linking causality and perfection; chief among these is the Principle of Proportionate Causality, according to which the perfections of effects preexist in their causes. In the spirit of Gödel’s ontological argument, this argument is formalized in higher-order modal logic. After presenting the axioms and the proof, I will discuss various refinements thereof.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on February 23rd from 2:00-4:00 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9205) over Zoom (details via mailing list) for a talk by Sara Ayhan (Tohoku).

Title: Contradictions without negation and a proof-theoretic, bilateralist account of connexive logics

Abstract: I’ll present the negation-free fragment of the bi-connexive logic 2C and investigate its properties from the perspective of bilateralist proof-theoretic semantics. I’ll argue that eliminating primitive negation has two important conceptual consequences. First, it requires a reconceptualization of contradictory (also called ‘überconsistent’) logics: in a bilateralist framework, contradiction need not be understood in terms of negation inconsistency, but rather as the coexistence of proofs and refutations for certain formulas within a non-trivial system. Second, it challenges the standard definition of connexive logics, which typically rely on negation-based schemata. Instead, a rule-based conception of connexivity, grounded in bilateralist proof-theoretic semantics, is proposed. This reconception avoids dependence on the validation of specific formula schemata and thereby also dependence on negation. 

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on February 9th from 2:00-4:00 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9205) for a talk by Roman Kossak (CUNY).

Title: Petr Vopěnka’s new infinitary mathematics

Abstract: Petr Vopěnka (1935–2015) was an influential mathematician and deep and original thinker. In the 1970s, he developed  an axiomatic system of a non-Cantorial set theory, he called Alternative Set Theory (AST). I will present the  axioms of AST and the new concept of natural infinity on which they are based. I will also talk about how Vopěnka’s radical thoughts on the foundations of  mathematics evolved since the 1970s, as presented in his posthumously published book “New Infinitary Mathematics”.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on February 2nd from 2:00-4:00 in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 9205) for a talk by Xander MacSwan (CUNY).

Title: Why gaps and gluts don’t like De Morgans

Abstract: This paper explores the space of FDE sublogics which lack some combination of De Morgan Laws. A particular method is proposed for generating the sixteen logics, one for each combination of laws, by systematically applying what I will call modular alterations to standard FDE. Each alteration eliminates a particular De Morgan law from FDE both semantically, by making use of nondeterminism in the matrices, and proof theoretically, using rules that are derivable in FDE and are illustrative of contexts in which classical reasoning can be recaptured. The alterations are modular in that they are designed to be freely combinable, where each combination of alterations generates a unique member of the family of logics. After giving some independent philosophical motivation for the semantic and proof theoretic alterations, I will introduce each alteration in turn and prove soundness and completeness for the resulting logics. Finally, I will discuss the prospects of extending the same strategy to K3 and LP, for the definition of a material conditional, and of alternative methods for generating equivalent logics.

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 2:00 to 4:00 pm at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 9205) unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in-person only. The provisional schedule is as follows:

Feb 2. Xander MacSwan (CUNY)

Feb 9. Roman Kossak (CUNY)

Feb 16. NO MEETING

Feb 23. Sara Ayhan (Tohoku)

Mar 2. James Walsh (NYU) [Room 9207]

Mar 9. Chris Steinsvold (CUNY) [Room TBA]

Mar 16. Liam Ryan (New York)

Mar 23. Jamie Beardmore (Columbia)

Mar 30. Shin Matsuura (CUNY)

Apr 6. NO MEETING

Apr 13. Eno Agolli (CUNY)

Apr 20. Jacopo Giraldo (Padua)

Apr 27. Mel Fitting (CUNY)

May 4. Marian Călborean (Bucharest)

May 11. Mircea Dumitru (Bucharest)

May 18. A farewell to Graham Priest (Special Event)