The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on October 26th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) via Zoom for a talk by Lisa Warenski (CUNY).
Title: The Metaphysics of Epistemic Norms
Abstract: A metanormative theory inter alia gives an account of the objectivity of normative claims and addresses the ontological status of normative properties in its target domain. A metanormative theory will thus provide a framework for interpreting the claims of its target first-order theory. Some irrealist metanormative theories (e.g., Gibbard 1990 and Field 2000, 2009) conceive of normative properties as evaluative properties that may attributed to suitable objects of assessment (doxastic states, agents, or actions) in virtue of systems of norms. But what are the conditions for the acceptability of systems of norms, and relatedly, correctness of normative judgment? In this paper, I take up these questions for epistemic norms. Conditions for the acceptability of epistemic norms, and hence correctness of epistemic judgment, will be based on the critical evaluation of norms for their ability to realize our epistemic aims and values. Epistemic aims and values, in turn, are understood to be generated from the epistemic point of view, namely the standpoint of valuing truth.