Logical metainferentialism (Francesco Paoli)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on September 11th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Philosophy Program Thesis Room in 7113) for a talk by Francesco Paoli (Cagliari).

Title: Logical metainferentialism

Abstract: Logical inferentialism is the view that the meaning of the logical constants is determined by the rules of inference that govern their behaviour in proofs – in particular, sequent calculus proofs, according to the preferences of several recent authors. When it comes to the nuts and bolts, however, the view is tenable only if certain aspects – concerning e.g. harmony criteria for rules, normal forms, or proof-theoretic validity – are clarified. Sequent calculus inferentialists generally do so in terms of proofs from axioms, not of derivations from assumptions. Although the merits of this approach are already debatable in traditional settings, recent work on sequent calculi without Identity or Cut has revealed further shortcomings. Logical metainferentialism revises inferentialism in this more general perspective. In this talk, we will sketch the basics of this view and argue that, from this vantage point, the claim that LP is the “One True Logic” may appeal even to the inferentialistically inclined logician.

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