Non-classicality all the way up (Will Nava)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on September 18th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Room 4419) for a talk by Will Nava (NYU).

Title: Non-classicality all the way up

Abstract: Nearly all non-classical logics that have been studied admit of classical reasoning aboutthem. For example, in the logic K3, A or not-A is not a valid schema. However, A or not-A’ is K3-valid or not K3-valid—this is, in some sense, a valid claim. In this talk, I introduce a simple framework for thinking about the logic of a given logic. This allows for a measure of the non-classicality of a logic—one on which almost all familiar non-classical logics are of the lowest grade of non-classicality. I’ll then discuss some strategies for generating and theorizing logics of higher grades of non-classicality, as well as some motivation for taking these logics seriously.

Published
Categorized as Fall 2023

Logical metainferentialism (Francesco Paoli)

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will meet on September 11th from 4:15-6:15 (NY time) in-person at the Graduate Center (Philosophy Program Thesis Room in 7113) for a talk by Francesco Paoli (Cagliari).

Title: Logical metainferentialism

Abstract: Logical inferentialism is the view that the meaning of the logical constants is determined by the rules of inference that govern their behaviour in proofs – in particular, sequent calculus proofs, according to the preferences of several recent authors. When it comes to the nuts and bolts, however, the view is tenable only if certain aspects – concerning e.g. harmony criteria for rules, normal forms, or proof-theoretic validity – are clarified. Sequent calculus inferentialists generally do so in terms of proofs from axioms, not of derivations from assumptions. Although the merits of this approach are already debatable in traditional settings, recent work on sequent calculi without Identity or Cut has revealed further shortcomings. Logical metainferentialism revises inferentialism in this more general perspective. In this talk, we will sketch the basics of this view and argue that, from this vantage point, the claim that LP is the “One True Logic” may appeal even to the inferentialistically inclined logician.

Published
Categorized as Fall 2023

Fall 2023 Schedule

The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) unless otherwise indicated. Talks will be in-person only at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 4419). The provisional schedule is as follows:

Sep 4. NO MEETING

Sep 11. Francesco Paoli (Cagliari)

Sep 18. Will Nava (NYU)

Sep 25. NO MEETING

Oct 2. Brett Topey (Salzburg)

Oct 9. NO MEETING

Oct 16. Yale Weiss (CUNY)

Oct 23. Melissa Fusco (Columbia)

Oct 30. Brad Armour-Garb (SUNY Albany)

Nov 6. Alex Citkin (Independent Scholar)

Nov 13. Alex Skiles (Rutgers)

Nov 20. Marian Călborean (Bucharest)

Nov 27. Mircea Dumitru (Bucharest)

Dec 4. James Walsh (NYU)

Dec 11. Rohit Parikh (CUNY)

Published
Categorized as Fall 2023